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HEGEL AND PROGRESSIVISM
We often assert that the United States’ constitutional principles began to change 
near the beginning of the twentieth century. This change is associated with “pro-
gressivism.” It was trumpeted by publicists and authors such as Herbert Croly and 
John Dewey, and implemented by political leaders such as Woodrow Wilson and 
the two Roosevelts. Progressivism involves moving away from limited govern-
ment toward the beginnings of the welfare state, increasing the regulation of bu-
siness, expanding the dominance of the President over Congress, justifying direct 
appeals from the President to the people (leadership as opposed to statesmanship), 
and attacking the teaching of individual natural rights in favor of group interests, 
mass appeals, and some forms of (weak) collectivism.
While searching for a serious intellectual ground for this movement, scho-
lars have alighted upon Hegel.
The influence of German political philosophy is evident […] from the historical pedigree 
of the most influential progressive thinkers. Almost all of them were either educated in Germany or 
had as teachers those who were […] Johns Hopkins University, founded in 1876, was established 
for the express reason of bringing the German educational model to the United States, and produced 
several prominent progressives, including Wilson, Dewey, and Frederick Jackson Turner. Among 
other things, American progressives took from the Germans – and especially from the German 
philosopher G. W. F. Hegel and his disciples – their critique of individual rights and social compact 
theory and their organic or “living” notion of the national state.1
1 R. J. Pe s t r i t t o  and W. J. A t to  in the introduction to their American Progressivism: A Reader, 







My purpose is to add to the understanding of American constitutionalism by dis-
cussing the connection between Hegel and progressivism. Of course, to employ 
Hegel merely to discuss progressive changes in the American regime is akin to 
using Brahms to explain the structure and power of film scores. One might argue 
that Brahms and Hegel are more interesting – and from the self-levitating point of 
view of political philosophy more important – than what they are being used to 
explain. So, while I will point out elements of Hegel’s intersection with progressiv-
ism, I also want to say something about his thought itself.2 Hegel’s thinking and its 
subjects are too large to be captured fully by progressivism, and progressivism is 
too narrow to capture fully even the politics of its time, let alone ours.
The Problem of Influence: I
Some of what I say about Hegel and modern government, therefore, will cover 
matters that are not exclusively or especially progressive. I will also not try to trace 
specific influences of the variety from Morris’s lectures, to Dewey’s notebooks, 
to Roosevelt’s speeches.3 How to assess the power of such influences is a diffi-
cult matter, not least because of the just mentioned disproportions between thought 
and politics, and between politics generally and any particular political movement. 
Thought and politics cannot be reduced to each other. Satisfying our interests, ex-
pressing our virtues, and following our opinions about what is right and wrong 
politically have their own motive powers that are not equivalent, in the flesh, to 
seeking the truth. A philosophic life is never fully at home politically. Political life 
is irreducibly contingent, ephemeral, and imperfect.
In the case of progressivism, for example, several factors were effective 
other than, or in addition to, lessons learned from Hegel. Politically, we may list the 
wishes to respond to growing urbanization, to massive business and financial com-
binations, to citizens’ exposure to business cycles, and to political ineffectiveness 
in dealing with them. Yet, on reflection, neither these problems nor the wishes and 
ways to respond to them are self-announcing or self-defining. By what standards, 
and within what conceptions, do such problems proclaim themselves as problems, 
and from what standpoint are solutions generated and considered to be plausible? 
Poverty that yesterday was acceptable, or even spiritually glorified, becomes unac-
ceptable today. Last month’s trusted public benefactors become this week’s private 
monopolists, whose trusts need busting. Temporary victims of economics’ natural 
2 I will limit my analysis to the Philosophy of Right. All references to the Philosophy of Right will be 
by paragraph number (e.g. #238), and the associated additions (e.g. #239A). Translations will be from Allen 
Wood’s edition. G. W. F. Hege l, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Hamburg 1955. The work was first 
published in 1821. I dem, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. by A. W. Wood, translated by H. B. N i sbe t, 
Cambridge University Press 1991.
3  Dewey studied at Johns Hopkins with George Sylvester Morris. Mor r i s  studied in Germany in the 
1860s, and wrote Hegel’s Philosophy of the State and History in 1887.
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laws become causes of public concern with whom we deal by better grasping those 
laws’ limits and opportunities. Salutary political circumspection in the face of pri-
vate action becomes inappropriate or even despicable political lethargy.
To say that the problems and solutions are not self-announcing, however, is 
not to say that they are based on fantasy, or on conceptions that must be altogether 
new. Within a notion of freedom, equality, and constitutionalism similar to Madi-
son’s and Hamilton’s, for example, someone at the close of the nineteenth century 
could well have worried legitimately about huge disparities in wealth, monopoli-
stic restrictions to freedom and competition, and the assimilation of immigrants. 
Indeed, it is sometimes hard to distinguish differences among liberal-republican 
responses to these facts, more immediate responses based on interest, and respon-
ses grounded on new “progressive” thoughts.
To the degree that new constitutional thoughts are important, moreover, we 
could hardly attribute them solely to Hegel, and to British and American Hegelians. 
We would need at least to consider the influence of Darwin and Marx (not to spe-
ak of lesser thinkers), remembering as well the tie between Marx and Hegel. We 
would also need to consider how a new or partially new frame for understanding 
politics is influenced by thinkers not only immediately but also indirectly, through 
the way they are taught or grasped socially, artistically, and economically. Social 
Darwinism and the aesthetic Nietzscheanism of, say, the Stefan George circle have 
political-intellectual effects different from the effects that Darwin and Nietzsche 
hoped to have had. Moreover, policy or institutional changes that we might as-
sociate with Hegel, or with a constitutionalist response to the facts progressives 
thought they faced may, in fact, have less to do with either of these than with the 
effects of the condition of American equality that Tocqueville discussed. Perhaps 
it is generally true, as Plato suggests in his Republic, that regimes and principles 
of justice have their own momentum and direction. Of course, these very changes 
can provide sympathetic access to certain thinkers, or slow the reception of others.
The Problem of Influence: II
These tangled connections might seem to be impenetrable. Many thinkers and 
much choice and action mingle in a disordered forest. Yet, a step back shows that 
the influence of thinkers on political life is, indeed, often significant and direct. The 
founding period of the United States is the obvious and remarkable example, and 
we can discern in it the importance and even dominance of Locke and Montesqu-
ieu, whatever the other factors.
The influence of such thinkers, moreover, comes not only from the power of 
their immediate rhetoric and practice, but also from their highlighting or summa-
rizing truths or partial truths. This, indeed, is the major source of the effect of their 
arguments. Locke uncovers natural rights, and the associated human character and 
296 MARK BLITZ
political institutions, in a manner that attracts those who follow him, and he shows 
how these truths can form or organize economic concerns, opinions about justice, 
and intellectual discoveries, even though these always remain somewhat indepen-
dent of political control. Such visible uncovering of natural truths, moreover, can 
increase their causal power by connecting them directly to human freedom and 
education, and by insinuating them attractively, and more or less coherently, into 
human actions and intentions, even the actions of those who are no longer directly 
influenced by thought. This coherence can also enable those of us who look back to 
see what was, and is, happening. Rousseau, for example, uncovers and inspires us 
to the romantic, and makes coherent, visible, and more easily choosable many prac-
tical and intellectual phenomena that we can organize under romanticism’s banner. 
But he does not invent these phenomena or, even, the phenomenon of the romantic. 
Nor, surely, is his thought the only cause of love, or the only significant thinking 
about it. The central philosophers uncover the grounds, alternatives, and coherence 
that make sense of the phenomena of everyday life. They are therefore able to en-
hance the immediate power of these grounds and this coherence, the standards and 
guidelines that we wittingly or unwittingly experience and seek in our actions and 
thoughts. By bringing things out and bringing them together in their brilliant and 
impressive way, they sometimes seem to have invented altogether new passions, 
forms of character, purposes, and institutions.
It is especially in this way that we may understand Hegel’s link to the pro-
gressives. Hegel influenced several German, British, and American thinkers direct-
ly, and they, in turn, influenced their students, both scholars and political officials. 
This is plain in Great Britain, where the famous or famously overeducated British 
civil servants of the late 19th through at least the mid-20th century were products 
of the education put in place by British Hegelians such as T.H. Green. But, as we 
said, many factors other than Hegel’s thought are also at work in establishing pro-
gressivism or recommending that we act progressively, and some “progressive” 
policies are prudent responses to changed circumstances, from a founding, consti-
tutionalist, standpoint. The basic connection between Hegel and progressivism is 
that his thought shows what is coherent and, arguably, true in these factors, in our 
being subject to, noticing, experiencing, and responding to them freely. In addition 
to, and connected with, his more direct influences, Hegel therefore enables many 
subsequent “progressive” actions to be chosen or developed, or to attain added 
strength, because he brings them, or the truths and links that underlie them, to the 
fore. Obviously, he is not responsible for each action that results from his having 
argued as he did, or for every distortion of his thought.
The best way to discover the newly apparent elements and coherence of ele-
ments that link Hegel to the progressives is to trace his novel thought about right or 
justice, in the Philosophy of Right. Hegel thinks of this work as “natural right and 
political science in outline,” i.e. he gives a traditional alternative title to his radical 
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book.4 A notion of natural right, in turn, is the heart of the American regime that 
the progressives sought to change. As we will see, much of what makes sense in 
the progressives can be anchored in Hegel’s new understanding of right. Not all of 
progressivism can be, however, and we will also point out important differences.
Individual Right
The first way that Hegel revolutionizes thinking about natural right (and in a man-
ner linked to the progressives), is to argue that individual right is inherently sub-
stantive, not abstract. The starting point of his political and moral thinking is each 
of us in his infinite personality. This means that each one can see himself apart 
from any engagement, and then go on to see himself as having tied himself to his 
engagements freely. This might suggest, contrary to what I just said, that our rights 
are in fact completely devoid of content. Both I and any particular outside activity, 
however, prove to be both unstable and unstatable if either of the separate halves is 
fully pressed or absolutized. They are in truth two halves of a whole.
Whatever the will has decided to choose [...] it can likewise relinquish [...]. But with this 
possibility of proceeding in turn beyond any other content which it may substitute for the previous 
one, and so on ad infinitum, it does not escape from finitude, because every such content is different 
from the form...and therefore finite; and the opposite of determinacy – namely indeterminacy, inde-
cision, or abstraction – is only the other, equally one-sided moment. (#16)
Neither my abstract personality and its rights nor my arbitrary interests but, 
rather, my concrete singularity or individuality is the first subject of justice.
Every apparent whole (such as the union of abstract will and arbitrary con-
tent) proves to be unstable, unfixable if chosen and impermanent when it is consi-
dered. It is part of another whole, which is, in turn, part of still another whole and 
so on and on until we reach the whole. The movement from part to whole to part to 
whole is Hegel’s famous dialectic, which is how the reason or logic in things ma-
nifests itself to us when we seek to understand, and how the reason in things forms 
our will and freedom, that is, how it manifests itself in, and defines, the imperfec-
tions and gathering points that spur us on when freely recognized.
Property
The partialness of the person, of subjectivity, means that the realm that makes up 
the rights that belong to us as persons, the realm of what Hegel calls abstract right, 
cannot, in fact, stand on its own. Therefore, a politics whose justice and institutions 
4 Consider the title pages in Hoffmeister’s edition.
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are based simply on abstract right cannot stand on its own. The liberal natural rights 
understanding is insufficient, both practically and theoretically, because liberal na-
tural rights are not independent truths. Liberal politics is a vital core of right, but it 
is destined to be overcome or subsumed.
I will now elaborate Hegel’s argument in order to set the stage for comparing 
it to progressivism, so that we can see how it provides coherence to progressivism 
and, also, shows some of progressivism’s limits. Property is the first stage of abs-
tract or natural right, as it is in Locke. Property, as Hegel understands it, is the free 
human forming of material, such that ownership is not actually attached to the ma-
terial. From the point of view that melds property with the body, such detachment is 
remarkable. When we consider it, indeed, we see that it is precisely this detachment 
that constitutes the forming of material things by my own immateriality. Property, 
however, is only a first stage in this forming, because right also implies, is defined 
by, and tends toward the recognition of free human forming itself. It is not only that 
we can make material things freely our own, but also that we can treat and deal 
with ourselves in this freedom. This happens when we contract with each other, 
because a contract fixes and establishes not so much something that I own as my 
free ownership itself, and my possibility of disposing of what is mine. While we 
can own what is not human, we can contract only with other men.
When we make contracts, however, we are still recognizing our freedom as 
serving our interests. We have not yet achieved the free establishing of our own 
will, our recognition of the objective course of our will, our freedom in all things. 
At the level of property and contract, our actual recognition of free humanity, as 
such, apart from specific interests, occurs when we punish criminals who violate 
us in our property. For when we punish them we are acknowledging them in their 
freedom simply, acknowledging them in a possibility of infinite action, but one 
carried out negatively. We punish criminals in their possibility of choice, not as 
animals enslaved to need.
Morality
This discussion of criminals or “wrong” completes Hegel’s analysis of the logic 
and movement of rights that occurs once we begin to step along the path of se-
eing ourselves in terms of our infinite freedom. If there were no more to say than 
this, however, it would be difficult to justify his notion that rights have stability 
and completion only substantively, and not when limited to questions of property, 
contract and crime. As Hegel sees it, to punish criminals is, in fact, not to complete 
moral and political reason, because to punish criminals out of implicit respect for 
their freedom is to see that freedom negatively. In punishing, we negate their own 
negativity, but we do not thereby establish our own free action in all its actual po-
wer. In owning, contracting, and punishing, freedom has not been chosen for its 
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own sake, for the sake of its own power. Our fuller freedom, the truer expression 
of the idea of freedom, is the positive actualizing of what is reasoning or universal 
in us. It is forming things, or, at least, the possibility of forming things, by our free 
choice because we are free. For freedom or will truly to unfold and be itself, there-
fore, it cannot simply be negative and a matter of punishing, but must also actualize 
itself positively. It can do this by willing what is positively good.
Such will and freedom are the substance of what we think of as morality. 
Morality seeks to shape my choices through my recognizing what is universal, 
and therefore, free and reasoning in me. I no longer act as a willing and rational 
being merely because this is what I am, but, now, because I understand that this is 
what I am. In this way morality makes me “good” and makes my choices good. 
Thus, for our abstract rights to be fully free, for them to be components of our posi-
tively actualized and recognized freedom, they must be universalized and chosen 
morally. Indeed, they must be universalized morally if they are to endure at all, 
because merely negative rights cannot satisfy and complete the practical reason 
and will that are their motive force. (Hegel offers powerful examples throughout 
the Philosophy of Right of the dissatisfaction, contradiction, and irresolution that 
occur at each stage that pretends to be, but is not in fact, the full actualizing or 
conceptualizing of right.)5 We must come to choose our rights as good and, indeed, 
see ourselves as choosing these goods simply because they are good, and because 
we are able to choose what is good simply because it is good. We must choose our 
rights because we recognize ourselves as able to choose what is good, and not only 
because they serve our interests. If we fail to do this we fail to choose our own 
freedom and reason, fail to recognize and actualize ourselves as free. Morality is, 
therefore, not an add-on to abstract right. Rather, right belongs to morality; it is part 
of moral choice. There is no stable abstract right without morality; abstract right 
points to morality as completing, stabilizing, and actualizing the freedom in which 
abstract right is grounded, but which it only imperfectly encapsulates. Morality is 
thus a truer or more complete component of freedom than are the abstract, or as we 
might call them from Hobbes onward, natural rights.
Morality’s Limits
The attempt to be moral, our self-consciousness about our ability freely to choose 
what is good because it is good and because we are free to choose it, does not yet 
complete Hegel’s discussion. Moral self-knowledge cannot itself tell us what is 
good substantively, and until we know this, disjunctions necessarily exist betwe-
en the will to do good and what is actually good. These disjunctions motivate us 
toward a freedom and right that is still more whole and complete than what moral 
5 Consider, for example, his discussion of hypocrisy and his remarkably prescient analysis of our cur-
rent form of intellectual irony, i.e. non-Socratic irony, in #140, and the addition to it.
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impulse alone can offer. Merely filling our interests according to rules of property, 
contract, and criminality, and then recognizing our ability freely to choose what is 
good because it is good, still leaves too much tension, or even contradiction, between 
our interests and our moral capacity, between our particularity and our universality. 
For these tensions to be overcome, and for us to will what actually is good because it 
is good, we must come subjectively to choose and recognize ourselves and our intere-
sts as part of an objective, universal form that permeates these interests, and does not 
merely float above or alongside them. Otherwise, free choice and particular interests 
fly apart, and I am not able fully to choose myself as rational and free.
Moral freedom as the will simply to be good tends to abstract itself from any 
connection to particular actions and institutions, all of which seem imperfect to it. 
Morality tends to an abstract righteousness. Indeed, the resultant passivity or isola-
tion is but a short step from its twin, the destruction of all difference in the name of 
universal purity. So, if moral universality and individual abstract rights do not effec-
tively interpenetrate, then what is rational and universal will not actually place itself 
in things and organize them. Moral reason is not the final stage of human freedom, 
because it is empty universality; when the abstract moral impulse is treated as the 
last word it can become nihilistic precisely because it seems to be necessarily at odds 
with the world of actual interests. If our freedom knows no step beyond the moral 
universal, even in so remarkable a form as Kant’s, let alone in some doctrines of the 
French Revolution, we will not actually and freely be choosing and being ourselves 
throughout a range of articulated determinations. But, it is precisely this articulating 
that is the substance of our letting reason go to work in things, letting it form things, 
seeing our own freedom, will, and reason objectively outside ourselves, and yet cho-
osing them subjectively as ourselves. For this articulation to occur, not only the abs-
tract right of property, but also the structures and processes by which I hold property, 
must be elevated to matters of moral choice. My moral freedom, choosing my actions 
as and because I recognize that I am a free, universal, rational, being must be able to 
satisfy my interests and welfare.
Love and Civil Society
Fortunately – or inevitably – the fact of interpenetration, the actualizing of the con-
cept, to use Hegel’s terms, occurs in the ethical world, the concrete institutions of 
family, civil society and the state, and our duties within them. What this means 
for the question of progressivism’s attempted reform or overcoming of America’s 
founding principles is that abstract right, individual natural right, can exist and can 
express freedom only together with, only within, a defined set of institutions. A use 
of our rights that actually is free and universal must shape, see, and satisfy itself 
within concrete practices and institutions, and not in any old thing under the sun. 
Unlike mere morality, ethical life is “intensely actual.”
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Love in the family is a good example of the interpenetration of individual 
and general that Hegel has in mind, and it also is a good example of the pressing 
dialectical movement that arises from, or even defines, the incompleteness of any-
thing that merely appears to be whole. Love makes intelligible what it means to 
say that one finds oneself only in the eyes and life of another, and, therefore, only 
together with another, although one is never simply that other. Love also makes 
clear what it means to say that a new whole, here the child, issues who both is and 
is not us, in whom we both do and do not see ourselves, and whose own adult fre-
edom demonstrates both the goal and dissolution of the family. Hegel’s criticism 
of Kant’s insistence that marriage is only a contract for sex, an opinion that ignores 
the substantive freedom and essential dignity of married life, makes evident his 
concern about the limits of a teaching about morality and rights that somehow 
overlooks the free individuality that issues from their genuine link.
An adult child leaves the family and enters civil society, which serves his 
particular economic needs. Yet each of us serves his needs and acts economically 
only as part of a universal rational system of law, police, division of labor, and 
money, and only within substantive professions and communities that provide the 
general education and general attention to welfare that allow each of us to be and 
see ourselves as the individuals we are. We are individuals only as concrete in-
stances of what is general and universal, and what is universal is only insofar as 
it is freely and concretely chosen by individuals (or implied by their choice), and 
recognized by them. This means that individual rights have substance and existen-
ce only within concrete kinds of general or universal institutions (as my family, 
profession, and country are both general in relation to me and particular in relation 
to other families, professions, and countries) which, therefore, must be protected 
and supported as institutions. The various professions and communities, the many 
“corporations,” are, for Hegel, as vital an element of civil society as the econo-
mic market. The restless creative destruction that is the characteristic movement 
of robust capitalism is not part of Hegelian rationalism. Moreover, because the 
expansion of desire in civil society is infinite, “deprivation and want are likewise 
boundless, and this confused situation can be restored to harmony only through the 
forcible intervention of the state.” (#185A) Once we leave the family, we become 
“son[s] of civil society” (#238), which therefore becomes responsible not just for 
the security of our person and property but also for securing our livelihood and 
welfare, our training in overcoming vice if our poverty gives rise to this, and our 
education “in so far as this has a bearing on [our] capacity to become members of 
society,” especially if our parents do not see to this. “Society has a right” “to com-
pel parents to send their children to school.” (#239A)
Civil society, through the public authority of the police power, is also re-
sponsible for providing public utilities, i.e. “means and arrangements which may 
be of use to the community,” that deal with “aspects of common interest in which 
the business of one is at the same time carried out on behalf of all.” (#235) Society 
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should, in addition, regulate markets where the “differing interests of consumers 
and producers” may fail “automatically” to re-establish a correct relationship be-
tween them. Inspecting commodities, ensuring that the public is not cheated, and 
regulating the value of common necessities, are all justified by the fact that some 
commodities are so universally used that they are offered not to individuals as such 
but to individuals “in a universal sense,” i.e. to the public. (#236)
Although morality and philanthropy are useful in dealing with several of the-
se issues, moral and philanthropic provision is inevitably contingent and, therefore, 
cannot replace either the duty or the effectiveness of public action. It is not through 
public action directly, however, but rather through the family and professional and 
other communities, that Hegel expects the requisite education, and the means to 
secure our own welfare, normally to be provided. Economic regulation and public 
provision, moreover, are intended to regulate markets and to counter the possibility 
of immiseration due to specialization and dependence, but they are not meant to 
take the place of, or unduly restrict, the expansion of industry, the growing satisfac-
tion of needs, and the increasing “accumulation of wealth” that is the characteristic 
unrestricted activity of civil society. (#243) The state or country is a greater whole 
than civil society, but it is not meant to replace it in its own sphere, and the police 
functions in civil society are not meant to replace healthy families and corpora-
tions. Hegel finds institutions such as the Republic’s abolition of the family and its 
forced assignment of jobs to be faulty precisely because they do not liberate and 
respect subjective freedom and choice. In general, Hegelian civil society is much 
more a private than a public world, but not the private world of naked individuals.
Politics and the State
Civil society as a whole, however, is still not a place where we concretely choose 
what is universally good because it is universally good. From where, after all, do 
free and just laws arise? Choosing what is universally good because it is universally 
good, and because we recognize ourselves as choosing it for this reason, occurs 
in the state, by which Hegel means something of what we mean by a country or 
a country’s way of life: it is the mind or spirit of the nation, especially as we con-
sider it to be politically formed and politically active. The state is structured and 
organized by the constitution, and the constitution has three elements: the sovereign, 
the executive, and the legislative. The law is universal, execution is particular, and 
sovereign (e.g. monarchical) decision in foreign affairs, and in activating laws and 
their execution, actualizes the state’s composite individuality.
These three constitutional elements deal with civil society and the family 
when they require universal laws in order to be themselves. In this sense, the state 
shapes or rationalizes their activities and, in turn, receives strength from individuals 
who recognize that they reach their own ends only within the country. We are truly 
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and completely ourselves, truly a union of interest and moral good, of universal and 
particular, in patriotic devotion, and when we perform our civic duties and obey 
the laws. The constitutional elements or forms do not delay and check, moreover, 
as if the main thing we need from government is that it leave us alone. Rather, the 
three powers work together concretely, while generating the energy caused by their 
separation. New laws and practices, indeed, will do more than deal with new cir-
cumstances. They will also change the active meaning of the constitution (and its 
elements), which is always living, because it is part of a living state.
Insofar as each citizen is politically active beyond merely obeying the law 
or serving patriotically, he properly enjoys this political activity not as an isolated 
individual, but through his family, community, and corporation, as these are po-
litically organized into various “estates” divided between two chambers: one for 
large landholders, the other for the professions and occupations of civil society. We 
all express ourselves in a public opinion that is sometimes intelligently, and often 
unintelligently, formed by a press that is largely free, and by the ample publicity 
we receive about legislative deliberations. Our representatives are not bound by 
our opinion or by the opinion of those of us who vote, however, because their job 
is to represent what we ultimately know is good for us, not our passing whims and 
interests. In any event, the true source of political activity is not the legislature, but 
the sovereign or, indeed, the ministers and civil servants who, in fact, devise the 
laws and see to their execution. Nonetheless, we are, in the ways just discussed, all 
involved in choosing the laws and, of course, in obeying them. Each of us, therefo-
re, recognizes the law as universally good and as our own. Each is thus conscious 
of his activities and interests as belonging to and actualizing what is substantively 
good, and comprehensively ethical. Abstract rights are validated within the con-
crete forms of legal action that are the rational frameworks that shape the activities 
that serve my education and satisfaction, and that of my family and profession. The 
state is not my servant, nor am I the servant of monarchs or aristocrats. The state is 
the organic whole of which my activity and satisfaction comprise a vital part.
Civil Service and Foreign Affairs
The group whose profession it is to do nothing but consider what is universal and 
implement it is the civil service. The civil service is the middle or mediating class 
that brings the parts together into a whole. It is the country’s most obviously ratio-
nal political element. Members of the civil service may, of course, need help from 
the people to ascertain circumstances, and guidance from the higher ranks to act 
properly and acceptably. As such, however, the civil service acts rationally. In ac-
cord with its universal and rational station, membership in it is to be open to all and 
its members are paid. Its particular origins, its sustenance, and its ends, therefore, 
all become universal. Nonetheless, it does not stand for the country as a country, the 
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state as a state in its active singularity. As we said, Hegel finds this unity in the so-
vereign’s activity, most visibly in foreign affairs. The state’s singularity, however, 
as is true of all other particularity, is imperfect. The state is ultimately moved by the 
very insufficiency of its own individuality, impelled by the reason that it cannot be 
itself by being insular, by being itself simply. Its insufficiency means, for example, 
that if the courage shown by soldiers in war is for the sake of something too selfish 
and particular it will not be fully satisfactory. The universality that we find in fore-
ign affairs, however, the international law that governs war and commerce, is itself 
insufficient because it is too formal or abstract; it fails to interweave properly the 
state’s interests and its devotion to something beyond itself. This difficulty exists 
even, or especially, because sovereign states are and ought to be free to reject the 
obligations that international law places before them.
The state is the active whole within which we are organic parts, but of what 
is it, as an individual, itself truly a part? Neither the pursuit of interest nor of inter-
national morality weds the singularity of the state concretely to a principle that sha-
pes its substance, and in which it is embedded. The true marriage of particular and 
general in foreign affairs comes through political world history, one of the ways 
(in addition to, and linked with, art, religion, and philosophy) that reason or spirit 
exists in its own element, and is fully actualized. A dominant state expresses or 
carries outside itself not only selfish interest or abstract rules, but a set of principles 
or institutions that shape the world, yet shape it only imperfectly, restlessly, insuffi-
ciently, or partially. Hence, there is the movement, in ordered sequence or stages, of 
Oriental despotism, the Greek and Roman principles of ethical beauty and abstract 
universality and, finally, the Germanic world, which carries and completes the po-
litical institutions and principles that we have just been discussing. Political history 
and foreign affairs are not incidental to justice and understanding, but a necessary 
and crucial part of them. Fame goes to the Caesars who express the deeds of the 
nation that for one and only one moment has an “epoch-making role,” enjoying an 
“absolute right” with regard to other nations because it is the “bearer of the present 
stage of the world spirit’s development.” (#347) Ultimately, indeed, when this de-
velopment is completed, even the humblest citizen is able to stand in the ranks of 
the world spirit no less proudly, although less self-consciously, than Hegel himself.
Hegel and Progressivism
I will now briefly collect the elements of this account that also belong to the diffe-
rences between the progressives’ understanding of American constitutionalism and 
that of the founders. I will leave the question of history and foreign affairs to the 
end, but will otherwise work backwards, because in the Hegelian circle or whole 
one ought to be able to start from anywhere, and reach the same place.
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First is the civil service, understood to be wiser than the people and more 
purely just than they are. Civil servants are the ones who seek to be beyond interest, 
and to do only what is rational. As we said, higher-ups in or above the civil service 
need the people to tell them the details of what their subordinates are doing, and 
civil servants need help in gathering facts. Nonetheless, it is only the civil servants 
who in their tasks and responsibilities seek to be beyond any interest, and to do only 
what is rational. Such a civil service is quite literally the ideal toward which pro-
gressive reforms marched, and to some degree marched successfully. The Hegelian 
civil service is more radical than our own, however, because the public service is 
not only ministerial to the business affairs of civil society, but a truer and more 
comprehensive expression of the universal dignity and purpose of the state. Al-
though the intended dispassion of our own civil service points in this direction, its 
bureaucratic fairness is meant, on the whole, to be subordinate to the real action, 
which is economic action.
A second important connection between Hegel’s account and the ideals and 
modes of analysis of progressivism is the notion of a living constitution, more 
British in design than American, where the different branches are not checks but 
connected parts of a whole, where the constitution is less a frame of forms in which 
deliberation is tied to delay and more a mechanism for collective will, judgment, 
and implementation, and where the distinctions of government by the one, few, or 
many are not especially relevant. Government is meant to be neither monolithic nor 
arbitrary, and for this freedom to be achieved, legislative representation and execu-
tive implementation, and not merely sovereign action and decision, are necessary. 
But, above all, the constitution is intended to advance the country’s singular and 
united action in a manner that is both objectively valid and ultimately acceptable 
to subjective individual choice. Such a conception sounds, and is, more Wilsonian 
than Madisonian.
A third link is the notion that representation involves deputies from substan-
tive wholes, and that universal law and activity treat individual interests only within 
such wholes. There is a localism in Hegel, and elements of communitarianism that, 
while hardly in tune with all of progressivism, fit elements of certain thinkers, such 
as Dewey. It is not merely that social life, welfare, and much education are tied to 
the family and civil society. It is that political representation itself is based on struc-
tures that formally (and not merely informally, as do, say, interest groups) reflect 
the organization of civil society. Neither individuals, political parties or pressure 
groups but, rather, “corporations” are the ground of legislative representation.
A fourth connection is the argument that the intelligibility and existence of 
rights cannot finally be stated or seen apart from moral freedom and duty, or apart 
from concrete life within the family, business, the professions, and trades. Ulti-
mately, indeed, rights cannot exist without state action. Our abstract rights are but 
a first step; they are rooted in a substantive individuality to whose full unfolding 
they contribute but for whose concrete expression they cannot substitute. The state 
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is responsible not only for economic regulation but also for securing the qualities 
and characteristics that are necessary for active life in civil society – education and 
relief from poverty, for example – when the family and other institutions fail. Some 
of this emphasis on social groups is more communitarian than progressive, but it is 
also progressive, for many progressives believed that groups such as labor unions 
had significant functions and meaning. And, in general, progressives understood 
equal opportunity not just as something to be advanced by securing equal rights, 
but as something to be formed and secured by substantive economic and social 
interventions.
A fifth link is the sense that, ultimately, there need be no conflict between the 
moral and political good and science or knowledge. The state in Hegel is consonant 
with art, religion, and philosophy, ultimately completed by them, not, at the end of 
the day, challenged by them, properly understood. The emblematic civil servant is 
the professor, perhaps even the professor of philosophy. For progressives generally, 
administrative or bureaucratic rationality can and should supplant political friction 
and partisanship in the service of the common good.
A sixth important connection is in the conduct and purpose of international 
affairs, and the link to the progress that is the nominal heart of progressivism. Hegel 
is chief among the thinkers from whom the notion arises that the meaning and 
purpose of human activity is historically cumulative, and that world progress is 
aided, or even brought about, by war and international politics. Hegel’s discussion 
of foreign affairs in the Philosophy of Right – namely manly activity for the sake of 
universal principles – nicely combines Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson.
Hegel is also the primary figure among thinkers who argue that there are 
such significant, coherent, and linked orders of constraint and impulsion through-
out the process of human action that we can speak of historical stages, worlds, or 
realms. It would take us outside our task to develop his argument about histori-
cal necessity and contingency beyond the points that we have already mentioned.6 
(Such a discussion would, among other matters, involve an analysis of his view of 
the influence of thinkers, an analysis that is connected, but surely not identical, to 
the argument with which I began.) For our discussion here, the point is that a notion 
is general among progressives that our current stage is different from the founders’ 
stage, and that we have in many ways outgrown the institutions that may have been 
sensible for them. This notion is more immediately Darwinian and Marxist than 
Hegelian, but it is at root Hegelian. Hegel is the hard core of all later and intellectu-
ally softer thinking about politics and morality in terms of stages that progress on 
the way to an actualized ideal.




I will conclude by reminding us of elements in Hegel’s unfolding of political scien-
ce and natural right that do not rest easy with progressivism, or with other elements 
of our contemporary political opinions.
Hegel is less democratic than the progressives were, or than we are today. 
Initiatives and referenda would horrify him. Basing politics on individuals as vot-
ers who are separated from concrete ties would frighten him; so too would politi-
cal interests that see no justice in rising above immediate favors and concerns to 
a truly public point of view. Political – or intellectual – pandering to ignorant pub-
lic opinion and pretending to lead it, or actually “leading” it, would sicken him. 
The weakening of the family as women take their place in the universal worlds 
of civil society, business, the professions, and civil service would strike him as 
regressive, substituting pale abstraction for concrete excellence. Excessive reliance 
on the judiciary, a relatively minor entity in the civil service, would worry him. 
Relativism, intellectual irony, rootlessness, and narrow-minded tribalism would all 
disturb him. None of these things would surprise him, however, because he had 
already, in various writings, analyzed them with a precision and cogency that it 
would be difficult to match and, perhaps, impossible to surpass. In general, Hegel 
is too tough-minded to have wanted to father progressivism or any other ism, and 
he would see our departures from Hegelian rationality as the unfortunate products 
of our shallow contingency.
